We study the war of attrition and the all-pay auction when players' signals are affiliated and symmetrically distributed. We (a) find sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric monotonic equilibrium bidding strategies; and (b) examine the performance of these auction forms in terms of the expected revenue accruing to the seller. Under our conditions the war of attrition raises greater expected revenue than all other other known sealed bid auction forms.
Introduction
Since the classic work of Vickrey [19] , the ranking of various auction forms in terms of expected revenue has been the central question of auction theory (Milgrom [12] and Wilson [20] provide surveys). When the bidders are risk-neutral
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and their information about the value of the object is independently and identically distributed, the so-called "revenue equivalence principle" (see, for instance, Myerson [15] ) provides a complete answer to the revenue ranking question. When the assumption of independence is relaxed, the answer is less well understood. Utilizing the assumption that the bidders' information is affiliated, Milgrom and Weber [13] develop the most comprehensive set of revenue ranking results to date; however, they restrict attention to "standard" auction forms in which only the winner is required to pay.
In this paper, we extend the analysis of Milgrom and Weber [13] to auctions with the property that losing bidders also pay positive amounts. 1 Specifically, we examine the performance of two alternative auction forms, the war of attrition and the all-pay auction. These auction forms share the common feature that all losing bidders pay exactly their bids and differ only in the amounts paid by the winning bidder. In the former, the winning bidder pays the second highest bid; whereas in the latter, the winner pays his own bid. As such, they are analogous to the standard second-price and first-price sealed bid auctions, respectively. 2 We identify circumstances in which the expected revenue from the auctions considered here exceeds that from the corresponding auctions in which only the winner pays. Thus, the war of attrition yields greater revenue than the second-price auction, and the all-pay auction yields greater revenue than the first-price auction. We also show that the war of attrition outperforms the all-pay auction and thus yields higher revenue than all known sealed bid auctions.
Our reasons for examining these alternative, "non-standard" auction forms are threefold: First, from a mechanism design standpoint, the restriction to allocation schemes which require only the person receiving the object to pay seems unwarranted. Second, although these forms may not be widely used in an auction setting, the underlying games are natural models of conflict in many situations. For instance, the war of attrition has been used as a model for conflict among animals and insects ( [10] , [3] ) and the struggle for survival among firms ( [8] ), while the all-pay auction has been used to model the arms race ( [17] ) and rent-seeking activity, such as lobbying ( [5] , [4] ). Our third reason for considering these forms 1 Of course, in an auction with an entry fee each bidder would also pay a positive amount. However, the amount would be fixed by the seller and, unlike the auctions we consider, not depend on the bid itself. 2 Indeed, the "war of attrition" is perhaps better described as a "second-price all-pay auction" and the "all-pay auction" as a "first-price all-pay auction." We have chosen, however, to retain existing terminology.
is that, as our results indicate, they raise greater revenue than the forms previously considered and hence are worthy of attention as auctions per se. 3 This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly describes the model used in the analysis. Since this is the same as the model in [13] , we eschew a detailed description. As in [13] , our major assumption is that bidders' signals are affiliated. In Section 3, we find sufficient conditions for the existence of a symmetric and increasing equilibrium in the war of attrition. Section 4 contains a parallel development for the all-pay auction. In both the war of attrition and the all-pay auction, we find that symmetric, increasing equilibria exist if bidders' signals are not "too affiliated." In Section 5, we develop revenue comparisons between these auctions and the standard forms. These comparisons form the basis for the results reported above. Section 6 studies circumstances under which the symmetric equilibria we consider are unique in the class of increasing equilibria. Technical results are collected in two appendices. Appendix A contains some useful results on affiliated random variables. Appendix B contains some results relevant for Section 6.
Preliminaries
We follow the model and notation of Milgrom and Weber [13] exactly. There is a single object to be auctioned and there are n bidders. Each bidder i receives a real valued signal, X i , prior to the auction that affects the value of the object. Let S = (S 1 , S 2 , ..., S m ) be other random variables that influence the value but are not observed by any bidder. The value of the object to bidder i is then:
where u is non-negative, continuous, and increasing 4 in its variables. The random variables S 1 , S 2 , ..., S m , X 1 , X 2 , ..., X n have a joint density f (S, X 1 , X 2 , ..., X n ), and the function f is symmetric in the bidders' signals. The random variables S 1 , S 2 , ..., S m , X 1 , X 2 , ..., X n are assumed to be affiliated, and it is assumed that
The reader should consult [13] for details. 3 While it is known that in common value settings it is possible to extract nearly all the surplus ( [7] , [11] ), the mechanisms that do this depend on the underlying distribution of signals. 4 Throughout the paper, the term "increasing" is synonymous with "strictly increasing."
In what follows, the random variable
the conditional density of Y 1 given that X 1 = x, and let F Y 1 j x denote the corresponding cumulative distribution function. The variables X 1 and Y 1 are also affiliated; in Appendix A we derive some simple facts about the conditional distribution, F Y 1 j x , that are useful for our analysis.
is a non-decreasing function of its arguments. As in [13] , we assume that it is, in fact, increasing.
Equilibrium in the War of Attrition
We model the war of attrition as an auction in the following manner. Prior to the start of the auction each bidder, i, receives a signal, X i , which gives him or her some information about the value of the object. Each bidder submits a sealed bid of b i , and the payoffs are:
where i6 =j. We have assumed that if b i = max j6 =i b j , the prize goes to each winning bidder with equal probability.
The analogy with the classic war of attrition model of conflict among two animals (Bishop, Canning and Smith [3] ) should be clear. The derivation of a symmetric equilibrium with independent private values, that is, when X i = V i and the X i 's are independently and identically distributed, is well known (see, for instance, [14] ).
We begin with a heuristic derivation of the symmetric equilibrium strategy. Suppose that players j6 =1 follow the symmetric and increasing equilibrium strategy . Suppose player 1 receives a signal, X 1 = x, and "bids" b. Then player 1's expected payoff is:
Maximizing (1) with respect to b yields the first order condition:
At a symmetric equilibrium, b = (x), and thus (2) becomes:
Rearranging this yields:
and thus:
The derivation of (4) is only heuristic because (3) is merely a necessary condition, and the global optimality of (x) against has not been established. Theorem 1 below provides a sufficient condition for to be a symmetric equilibrium.
Definition 1
The hazard rate of the distribution, F Y 1 ( j x ), is defined as:
With affiliation, the hazard rate, (y j x), is a non-increasing function of x (Lemma 2 in Appendix A). 
Definition 2
Proof. Let x denote the supremum of the support of Y 1 . If players j6 =1 use the strategy , then it is never profitable for player 1 to bid more than (x).
If player 1 bids an amount, (z), when the signal is x, his or her payoff is:
or:
Using the fact that:
we obtain:
Finally, observe that the equilibrium payoff to a player who receives a signal of x is:
and thus each player is willing to participate in the auction. 2
Notice that '(x, y) is the product of v(x, y) and (y j x) where the former is increasing in x, while the latter is decreasing in x. As a result, '(, y) is increasing if the affiliation between X 1 and Y 1 is not so strong that it overwhelms the increase in the expected value of the object, v(, y), resulting from a higher signal, x. Of course, the assumption is automatically satisfied if bidders' signals are independent.
The assumption that '(, y) is increasing can be replaced by the weaker condition that, for all x :
since this is all that is needed to ensure that Π(z; x) is maximized at z = x.
As an example of a situation where the conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied, suppose n = 2, and let X (resp. Y) be the random variable that denotes bidder 1's (resp. 2's) signal. Let:
, and (y j x) = 2(1+xy)
2+x 2y xy 2 , and it may be verified that '(, y) is an increasing function.
Next, let supp f X denote the common support of the bidders' signals, and let x and x denote the infimum and supremum of supp f X , respectively. Of course, it may be that x= 1 or x = 1 or both.
Two features of the equilibrium strategy, (5) deserve to be highlighted. First, a bidder receiving the lowest possible signal, x, bids zero. This is true even if v(x, x) is strictly positive. Second, as a bidder's signal approaches x, his bid becomes unbounded. Again, this holds even if the expected value of the object at x, v(x, x) is finite.
Proposition 1 Suppose that, for all y, '(, y) is an increasing function. Then (i)
lim xx (x) = 0; and (ii) lim xx (x) = 1.
Proof. (i) follows directly from (5).
To verify (ii), choose z such that v(z, z) > 0. From (5), we can write:
where the first inequality follows from the fact that '(, y) = v(, y)(y j ) is increasing and the second from the fact that v(z, ) is increasing.
But now observe that for all y:
Using (8) in (7) we obtain:
This completes the proof. 2
Equilibrium in the All-Pay Auction
In an all-pay auction each bidder submits a sealed bid of b i and the payoffs are:
where i6 =j. As before, we have assumed that if b i = max j6 =i b j , the prize goes to each winning bidder with equal probability.
Once again it is useful to begin with a heuristic derivation.
Suppose players j6 =1 follow the symmetric (increasing) equilibrium strategy .
Suppose player 1 receives a signal, X 1 = x, and "bids" b. Then player 1's expected payoff is:
Maximizing (9) with respect to b yields the first order condition:
At a symmetric equilibrium, (x) = b and thus (10) becomes:
Once again, the derivation is heuristic since (11) is only a necessary condition.
Theorem 2 Suppose that, for all y, (, y) is an increasing function. A symmetric equilibrium in the all-pay auction is given by the function defined as:
Proof. Let x denote the supremum of the support of Y 1 . If players j6 =1 use the strategy , then clearly it cannot be a best response for player 1 to bid more than (x). If player 1 bids an amount (z) when the signal is x, his or her payoff is:
Since, by assumption, (, y) is an increasing function, for all
It is useful to compare some qualitative features of the equilibrium strategy (12) in the all-pay auction to the equilibrium strategy (5) of the war of attrition. It is still the case that a bidder receiving the lowest possible signal, x, bids zero. This is true even if v(x, x) is strictly positive. However, in an all-pay auction, as a bidder's signal approaches x, his bid is bounded if the expected value of the object at x, v(x, x) is finite. This is in contrast to the unboundedness of the bids in the war of attrition.
Proposition 2 Suppose that, for all y, (, y) is an increasing function. Then
(i) lim xx (x) = 0; and (ii) lim xx (x) lim xx v(x, x).
Proof. (i) follows immediately from (12).
To verify (ii) notice that from (13):
and as x ! x, the right hand side tends to lim xx v(x, x). 2
Revenue Comparisons
In this section we examine the performance of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction in terms of the expected revenue accruing to the seller. As a benchmark, recall from Milgrom and Weber [13] that, with affiliation, the expected revenue from a second-price auction is greater than the expected revenue from a first-price auction.
War of Attrition versus Second-Price Auction
Our first result is that, under the condition that '(x, y) is increasing in x, the revenue from the war of attrition is greater than that from a second-price auction. Proof. In a second-price auction, the equilibrium bid by a bidder who receives a signal of x is v(x, x) (see [13] , pages 1100-1101), and thus the expected payment by such a bidder is:
In a war of attrition, the expected payment in equilibrium by a bidder who receives a signal of x is:
For y x, Lemma 2 in Appendix A implies that (y j y) (y j x) and thus:
using (14). 2
All-Pay Auction versus First-Price Auction
Our second result is that, under the condition that (x, y) is increasing in x, the revenue from the all-pay auction is greater than that from a first-price auction. 
Proof.
Let b (x) denote the equilibrium bid of a bidder who receives a signal of x (see [13] , page 1107). Then the expected payment is:
where
. (17) can be rewritten as:
From Lemma 4 in Appendix A, for all y < x:
Thus, we can write:
= e A (x). 2
War of Attrition versus All-Pay Auction
Our next result compares the expected revenue from the war of attrition to that from an all-pay auction. We first establish that the sufficient condition identified in Section 3 implies that there is an increasing equilibrium in the all-pay auction also.
Proposition 3 Suppose that '(, y) is an increasing function of x. Then (, y) is an increasing function of x.
Proof. Let x < x 0 . Then since '(, y) is an increasing function, we have that:
By Lemma 3 in Appendix A, F Y 1 (y j x) F Y 1 (y j x 0 ) and thus:
Now, from (19), we can immediately infer that:
which completes the proof. 2
We now show that if '(, y) is increasing, the war of attrition outperforms the all-pay auction. 
Theorem 5 Suppose '(, y) is increasing. Then the expected revenue from the war of attrition is greater than or equal to the expected revenue from an all-pay auction.
Proof. In an all-pay auction, the expected payment in equilibrium by a bidder who receives a signal of x is: (20) From (15) in a war of attrition, the expected payment in equilibrium is:
since, by Lemma 3 in Appendix A, for all y < x, F Y 1 (y j x) F Y 1 (y j y) and thus
Analogous to the result that the equilibrium bids in the second-price auction exceed those in the first-price auction, we have the result that the equilibrium bids in the war of attrition exceed those in the all-pay auction. To see this, observe that:
All-Pay Auction versus Second-Price Auction
It remains to compare the expected revenues from the all-pay auction to that from the second-price auction. We now show by means of two examples that no general ranking of the two auctions is possible.
Let:
The density function f satisfies the affiliation inequality. If v(x, y) = x, (x, y) is an increasing function of x so that the conditions of Theorem 2 are satisfied. Routine calculations show that, for all x > 0, e A (x) > e 2 (x), and thus, in this case, the expected revenue from an all-pay auction is greater than that from a second-price auction.
On the other hand, if v(x, y) = x 4 , we have that for x ' 0.707 :
and furthermore:
so that, in this case, the expected revenue from an all-pay auction is less than that from a second-price auction.
Summary of Revenue Comparisons
The relationships between the expected revenues from the various auction forms may be summarized as follows:
where e M is the expected revenue from the auction mechanism "M" and the symbols " ' " and " " mean, respectively, that the inequality holds when ' or is increasing. The result that e 1 e 2 is, of course, due to Milgrom and Weber [13] .
On the Uniqueness of Equilibrium
In this section, we examine whether the equilibrium in the war of attrition which we previously analyzed, is unique in the class of increasing equilibrium strategies. We then examine the same question for the all-pay auction. For both the war of attrition and the all-pay auction we provide sufficient conditions to guarantee the uniqueness of the respective equilibria of Theorems 1 and 2.
Let supp f X < denote the common support of the bidders' signals, and let x 2 < be the infimum of supp f X and x the supremum of supp f X . We allow for the possibility that x = 1 ; thus, we assume that
Throughout this section, we assume that there are only two bidders. Bidder 1 receives a signal of x and bidder 2 of y. The value of the object to bidder 1 is then v(x, y). It is assumed that v is continuously differentiable in its arguments.
The symmetric density f of the signals is assumed to be everywhere positive on its support and continuously differentiable on the interior of the support. Finally, we assume that the strategies employed by each bidder, 1 and 2 are strictly increasing.
The War of Attrition
It is well known that the war of attrition is plagued with a multiplicity of equilibria (see Riley [18] and Nalebuff and Riley [16] ). Thus it is not surprising that we need strong conditions to guarantee uniqueness. Our main result is: Define a function y : supp f X ! supp f X by:
Given a signal x for player 1, y(x) is the unique signal for player 2 which induces him to bid 1 (x) also.
Using (22) in (21) results in:
Differentiating (22) with respect to x yields:
Substituting from (23) into (24) yields the ordinary differential equation:
We may write this differential equation as y 0 (x) = g (x, y) . Since y(x) = x solves the differential equation (25), it is the unique solution and hence the symmetric equilibrium (, ) is the unique equilibrium. 2
To illustrate the workings of Theorem 6 it is useful to consider an example due to Riley [18] .
Suppose that v(x, y) = x, and X and Y are independently and identically distributed on [0, 1) with the density function f X (x) = e x . Then (x) = 1 for all x, and the differential equation (25) becomes:
together with the boundary condition that y(0) = 0.
Observe that for all k > 0, y(x) = kx is a solution to (26) and y(0) = 0. We have a continuum of solutions because the right hand side of (26) is not continuously differentiable in x (or even defined) at the point (0, 0), and thus, the conditions that guarantee a unique solution are not satisfied. For each k > 0, the following increasing strategies form an asymmetric equilibrium:
In terms of Theorem 6 the example fails to satisfy the condition that v(x, x) > 0. Consider a modification of the example so that, for x > 0, X and Y are independently and identically distributed on [x, 1) with the density function f X (x) = e (x x) . Again (x) = 1 for all x and the differential equation (25) remains:
together with a new boundary condition y(x) = x. Now, however, y(x) = x is the unique solution to (27) , and thus the symmetric equilibrium is the unique equilibrium with increasing strategies.
Consequently, we have that if x > 0, there is a unique equilibrium in the above example and multiplicity arises only when x = 0. Nalebuff and Riley [16] have shown that in the war of attrition there is an abundance of equilibria that are non-decreasing. In particular, these have the character that one player concedes to the other by bidding 0 when his signal is in some interval [x, x ]. Of course, such equilibria are inefficient in the sense that the auction may be won by the bidder who attaches a lower value to the object.
The All-Pay Auction
In this subsection we provide sufficient conditions for the symmetric equilibrium of Section 4 to be the unique equilibrium of the two bidder all-pay auction. Instead of providing detailed proofs which are very similar to the proofs in the case of the war of attrition, we indicate the arguments informally. Suppose 1 and 2 are equilibrium strategies in the all-pay auction and that these are both increasing.
First, by following arguments similar to those in Lemmas 6, 7, and 8 in Appendix B, we can establish that 1 and 2 are both continuous and have identical ranges. Next, the first order conditions for an all-pay auction imply that for all x and y:
As in the proof of Theorem 6 define:
And as before this results in a differential equation:
which is analogous to (25). Applying the uniqueness result once again (Theorem 1 in Chapter 15 in [9] ) we obtain:
Theorem 7 Suppose that (, y) is increasing and either
. Then the symmetric equilibrium (, ) from Theorem 2 is the unique increasing equilibrium of the two bidder all-pay auction.
Proof.
In case (i), the boundary condition y (x) = x may be used to show that (30) has a unique solution. In case (ii), the boundary condition y (x) = x may be used. Recall that f (xjx) and f (xjx) are both assumed to be positive. 2
The reader may wonder why condition (ii) in the above Theorem does not suffice for the conclusion of Theorem 6. The reason is that if supp f X = [x, x] then it must be that (xjx) = 1 and so the right hand side of (25) is not defined at
Conclusion
We have identified conditions under which the war of attrition and the all-pay auction generate higher expected revenue than their standard counterparts: the second-price and first-price sealed bid auctions. These conditions guarantee that the equilibrium strategies are increasing in the signals received by the bidders; and implicitly require that the affiliation between bidders' signals is not too strong.
If bidders' signals are strongly affiliated the possibility of non-increasing equilibria is not implausible. Suppose there is an increasing equilibrium. In such a situation, bidder 1, say, who receives a higher signal would consider it very likely that other bidders also received higher signals. Hence, the reduction in his conditional probability of winning the auction would overwhelm the increase in his expected value from receiving the higher signal. This would induce the bidder to lower rather than raise his bid because his prospects of losing the auction have increased, and, in these circumstances, he would be required to pay his bid. This destroys the increasing equilibrium. Under the presumption that there is a symmetric, pure-strategy equilibrium, such an equilibrium must be non-increasing. The characterization of symmetric equilibrium strategies in the two auctions when there is no symmetric increasing equilibrium remains an open problem.
Appendix A: Affiliation
In this Appendix we collect some miscellaneous results on affiliated random variables that are used to derive the results of this paper. 
Proof. Notice that:
Proof. Note that:
where the first inequality follows from the fact that
is a nondecreasing function; (Lemma 1) and the second inequality follow from the fact that F Y (x j ) is non-increasing. (Lemma 3). 2
Appendix B: Lemmas for Section 6
In this appendix we establish that if ( 1 , 2 ) is an equilibrium of the two bidder war of attrition and both 1 
where the first inequality follows from the assumption that ' , Suppose b = 1 (x). If player 1 bids b after receiving a signal of x, his expected payoff is:
Alternatively, if player 1 bids b after a signal of x his payoff is:
since player 2 never bids in the interval (b , b).
From (31) and (32)
By Lemma 5, y < x, F y j x < 1. Now, from (33), it follows that ( 1 (x); x) , contradicting the fact that 1 and 2 form an equilibrium. Again, from Lemma 5, y < x and thus, F(y jx) < 1. Hence, for some small , Π 1 ( 1 (x); x + ) > Π 1 ( 1 (x + ); x + ), which again contradicts the fact that 1 and 2 constitute an equilibrium. 2
From Lemmas 6 and 7, the following is immediate.
Lemma 8 Range 1 = Range 2 .
Lemma 9 1 (x) = 2 (x) = 0.
Proof. The fact that 1 (x) = 2 (x) follows from Lemma 8. If 1 (x) = 2 (x) > 0, then player 1's expected payoff when his signal is x is negative since he always loses and pays 1 (x). But then, a bid of 0 when his signal is x is a profitable deviation. 2
